This paper describes a key management scheme that is designed to work in low-power mobile ad hoc networks. The key management scheme is built around the concept of a neighborhood in which nodes dynamically establish link keys based on keying material they already possess. As nodes wander through the network, their neighborhood changes and the keys are updated to reflect this change in environment. Our protocol is designed to work in power constrained environments and only uses efficient symmetric cryptographic primitives.
Introduction
As technology advances and integration of low-power radio, computing and sensor technology becomes reality, the road is paved for distributed sensor networks (DSNs). These networks will typically consists of 1000's of ultralow power nodes, with limited communication means and CPU power [13, 20, 23] .
Distributed sensor networks (DSNs) can be used in a wide range of applications, including military sensing, environment monitoring, collecting vital signs of patients, smart houses, etc. As sensor networks will be deployed and possibly left unattended in hostile environments, security becomes very important. For example, an adversary may try to eavesdrop on confidential traffic, impersonate nodes to insert bogus data, and cripple normal network operation by maliciously modifying routing information.
In order to protect DSNs from these attacks, communication should be encrypted and authenticated. Although the capacities of these miniature sensors are growing, their resources are still very limited. In such an environment, where routing protocols are designed to be as efficient as possible, overheads are kept to a strict minimum and nodes go into sleep mode to save energy, security protocols should follow the same "energy-focused" design and consume as little power as possible.
This paper proposes a key management scheme that is based only on efficient symmetric cryptographic primitives. We show how our scheme compares to schemes based on computationally demanding public key cryptography.
Assumptions and setting
In order to be more concrete, we present our scheme using DSNs. However, our proposal is valid for all wireless ad hoc networks that have the following properties:
• Multi-hop routing: Mobile nodes that are within each other's radio range communicate directly through wireless links, while those that are further apart rely on other nodes to redirect and forward their messages.
• Dense: There are always many nodes within radio range.
For DSNs this is normally the case as measurements of one sensor are normally not very accurate and they are combined with results of other sensors in the vicinity to get a more reliable result.
• Mobile: It is generally assumed that DSN are static (for example sensors are distributed over a battle field and stay immobile) but in many cases this may not be so. For example buoys floating freely on the ocean to gather environmental data or miniature sensor nodes deployed in potential waste water sources and sewers will form highly dynamic ad hoc networks.
• Low power and a peanut CPU: Since the sensor nodes have to be small, they will have an equally small battery or solar panel. Moreover the battery will not be replaceable since the nodes may be physically unreachable once they have been deployed. The computational power of the sensor nodes is equally limited. As a consequence computationally demanding tasks such as modular exponentiation used by well known public key cryptosystems (e.g. RSA and ElGamal [16] ) should be avoided if possible. Although computational demands for asymmetric cryptosystems based on elliptic curves are much smaller [24] , their cost is still orders of magnitude higher than symmetric primitives [7] .
Related work
Eschenauer and Gligor [6] present a key management scheme for sensor networks based on probabilistic key predistribution. Chan et al. [4] extend this scheme and present three new mechanisms based on the same framework of probabilistic key pre-distribution. Du et al. [5] build on the Blom key pre-distribution scheme and combine it with the random key pre-distribution method. This way Du et al. can achieve a nice threshold property: when the number of compromised nodes is less than the threshold, then the probability that any uncompromised nodes are affected is close to zero. We note that these schemes limit the number of neighbors with which a node shares a secret key. Our scheme builds on these key pre-distribution protocols to bootstrap the Secure Neighborhood Discovery process.
Carman et al. [2, 3] have analyzed several approaches for key management in sensor networks. They present detailed performance evaluation of different schemes including key pre-distribution protocols, protocols using a trusted server, autonomous key agreement protocols and the use of identity-based public key cryptography. Perrig et al. present a security suite for sensor networks [19] . This suite contains SNEP, a protocol for data confidentiality and authentication and µTESLA, which provides authenticated broadcast. However, Perrig et al. assume that every node in the network is given a master key which is shared with a base station. Our scheme does not involve a base station and pairwise keys are established in a distributed fashion.
Zhou and Haas present a distributed key management service based on threshold cryptography [25] . In particular the functionality of the Certification Authority (CA) is distributed among multiple nodes in the network (servers). A node has to collect and combine partial signatures on its certificate from a subset of these servers. Distributing the secret key of the CA prevents an attacker from compromising the whole PKI by capturing a single node. We note that this scheme heavily relies on public key operations, while our scheme only uses efficient symmetric key operations.
Many solutions for securing routing protocols in ad hoc networks have been proposed in the literature. Most of these proposals can be classified into two groups depending on the assumptions the authors make on the key establishment mechanism. The first group assumes the use of public key cryptography and hence some form of PKI [8, 17] ; the second groups assumes that some mechanism is in place that establishes a shared key between any two nodes that want to setup a route [10, 18] .
Contributions of this paper
We present a novel key management scheme for lowpower mobile ad hoc networks. Our scheme only requires the use of efficient cryptographic primitives and does not depend on the use of more power consuming public key cryptosystems. The Wandering Nodes scheme is designed to work in highly dynamic networks where nodes move throughout the network. The scheme autonomously redistributes keying material to reflect the change in environment. Our scheme is not dependent on any manager nodes that operate as key distribution center (KDC). These properties make our scheme a fully autonomous, adaptive and true ad hoc key management scheme.
Secure Neighborhood Discovery protocol
Our protocol is based on the observation that nodes wander through a network and that they do not jump from one end of the network to the other. This means that our scheme works nicely in the setting of DSNs, but will fail for other ad hoc networks where nodes do jump from one geographical location to another (for example if the user carries the devices around and turns them on and off).
Security goals and assumptions
The goal of the Neighborhood Discovery is to (1) know its neighborhood, (2) establish link keys with all the nodes in its neighborhood, and (3) establish a broadcast key with the 1-hop neighbors. Having these symmetric keys in place ensures that it is possible to find a path between any two nodes in which every hop can be secured using a symmetric key.
Neighborhood
Every node is surrounded by its neighborhood. The neighborhood of node W is the collection of all nodes W can reach in h or fewer hops. We call h the radius of the neighborhood. In Fig. 1 we depict the neighborhood of node W as it travels through the network. At time t 1 W 's neighborhood (with radius 1) contains only two nodes. Obviously as W moves its neighborhood changes: at time t 3 the neighborhood of W has completely changed and now contains 4 nodes.
Because of the limited memory of the (sensor) nodes we assume that every node only keeps security related information on the nodes in its neighborhood. The following information is stored:
• the identities of the nodes in the neighborhood;
• secret keys shared with nodes in the neighborhood;
• keying material of a group key scheme: used to secure broadcast messages; • keying material of the broadcast groups and counter values of its neighbors (= neighborhood of radius 1): used to verify or decrypt broadcast messages sent by these neighbors.
Bootstrapping the system: key pre-distribution
In this paper we assume that all nodes share symmetric keys with at least one or more of its neighbors. A number of key pre-distribution schemes have been proposed that can achieve this goal [4, 5, 6] . If for some reason the key predistribution scheme fails to setup at least one shared key between some node and its neighbors, this node will be excluded from the network.
Dynamic neighborhood discovery
Keeping an up-to-date view of the neighborhood. The neighborhood is discovered by periodically (every ∆T milliseconds) broadcasting a JOIN request to the neighborhood. If some new node receives this request, it will answer with its identity. Nodes that are already part of the neighborhood send an updated view of their own neighborhood to the initiator of the request. When the initiator of the JOIN request sees that a new node has arrived in its neighborhood, it will initiate the process of setting up a link key with the newly arrived node. In Fig. 1 node W (the black square) initiates a Neighborhoods Discovery process by sending JOIN requests at times t 1 , t 2 , t 3 and t 4 . The circle around W indicates its neighborhood at these times. For the Neighborhood Discovery protocol to operate correctly, two consecutive (in time) neighborhoods should share at least one node. If not, then node W does not share a link key with any node in its new neighborhood and has no means of setting up link keys with its new members. The time interval ∆T between two consecutive JOIN requests is a parameter of the system and is dependent on how dynamic the network is: high mobility requires a small ∆T , while an almost static network can operate with less frequent neighborhood updates.
Setting up link keys. As a result of the key predistribution scheme, all nodes share a symmetric key with at least one of their neighbors. We build on this to bootstrap the Neighborhood Discovery protocol. We use trust transitivity to authenticate nodes we don't yet share a key with: if A shares a key with B and B shares a key with C, then A and C can use the link keys they share with B to setup a shared secret key. We refer to section 5 for the details of our protocol to setup these link keys. As more link keys are installed, these nodes can also participate in the process of setting up link keys with other nodes. This process continues until every node shares a secret link key with all nodes in its neighborhood.
Setting up broadcast keys. Once all link keys have been established in the neighborhood, they can be used to setup a broadcast key with the 1-hop neighbors. We will not discuss the details of the exact implementation of setting up these broadcast keys, but group key management schemes where every node is the group manager for its neighborhood are suited for this task [15, 21] .
Establishing link keys
In this section we describe our protocol to establish link keys between two nodes. The most important use is to setup new link keys within a neighborhood. A second use is to setup a link key to provide end-to-end security between nodes that are not within the same neighborhood. The mechanism is exactly the same for both cases. Neighbourhood of W at time t3 Figure 1 . Node W travels through the network. 
General operation
Suppose node S wishes to establish a link key SR between itself and node R. Since S and R do not yet share a secret key, we will use the broadcast keys of all the intermediate nodes to securely setup a route between S and R. We assume that the routing scheme used by the network has provided S with one or more routes to R and vice versa. For now, we also assume that for at least one of these routes between S and R all intermediate nodes have established link keys with their neighbors on the route. We will call such a route a "trusted route".
Node S initiates the key establishment protocol by sending a request to node R. When R receives this request for a link key, it checks how many routes there are between itself and S. Then it generates the link key SR that will be used between R and S. Using the information R has about the number of routes to S it uses a (m, n) secret sharing mechanism (for example Shamir's Secret Sharing using polynomials [22] ) to split the secret into shares. Node R now sends one of the shares to S using a different route provided by the routing mechanism. As routes may already be broken before the shares reach the initiator of the request, the parameters of the secret sharing mechanism should be chosen in such a way that the secret can still be reconstructed by the initiator (S) even if some shares are lost.
The shares are encrypted hop-by-hop using the already established link keys on the route between S and R. Using hop-by-hop encryption we prevent nodes outside the network from learning any of the shares. Using the secret sharing scheme we further limit the number of nodes that may learn the link key between S and R. For example in Fig. 2 only node C is able to reconstruct the secret SR because all routes between S and R pass through it. Obviously, if only one route is available, then all nodes on this route will learn the link key between S and R. The protocol can be strengthened by requiring at least two disjoint routes. If no disjoint routes exist, node R can notify S that it is impossible to securely setup a key at this time and wait for the network to reconfigure. Here, mobility can help to provide more security.
Exceptional operation
In the previous description we assumed that there is at least one trusted route between S and R on which all intermediate nodes share a link key that can be used to secure the communication over this route. In the early stage of the network (right after deployment) however, it is possible that no such route exists between a node and one or more nodes in its neighborhood. Suppose for example that nodes S and C share a link key (because of the key pre-distribution scheme) and nodes B and C (see Fig. 2 ). If the neighborhood radius h ≥ 2 then our scheme requires that nodes S and B establish a link key (if possible).
In this case S will send a message to B including a request to establish a link key, together with a list of nodes with which S already shares a link key. Node B will look for nodes in this list with which it also shares a link key (in our example C). Now B will contact node C (which will play the role of KDC) with a request to establish a link key between S and B. Any secure key establishment protocol involving a KDC [16, chap. 12] can be used to fulfill this task.
This scheme is only used within a node's neighborhood, and probably only right after the initial deployment in order to speed-up the process of establishing the link keys within the neighborhood.
Implementation based on DSR
We will now show how our key management scheme can be added to the Dynamic Source Routing protocol (DSR) [12] and how DSR can be secured with the link and broadcast keys our scheme provides. We have selected DSR because it is a well known on demand routing scheme that is suited for dynamic ad hoc networks. We present a high level description of the DSR protocol.
Dynamic Source Routing. When a node has a packet to send to some destination for which it has no route in its route cache, the node initiates a Route Discovery to find a route. The initiator of the Route Discovery broadcasts a Route Request (RREQ) packet. This packet has the following format: SourceAddr, DestAddr, List of intermediate nodes, ReqID . The "list of intermediate nodes" is initially empty. When some node receives a RREQ packet, it appends its identity to the list of intermediate nodes, and broadcasts the new RREQ packet. When the request reaches its target node, this node sends a Route Reply (RREP) packet back to the initiator of the request. This packet with following format Reversed list of intermediate nodes = route to SourceAddr, SourceAddr, ReqID is routed through the reversed list of intermediate nodes. Upon receiving a RREP packet the initiator adds the route in this RREP to its route cache. Multiple routes may be available after receiving multiple valid RREP packets that contain different routes. DSR uses source routing: when sending a packet, the originator includes the complete sequence of nodes through which the packet is to be forwarded. Note that this is a very rudimentary description of DSR, for a detailed description we refer to [12] .
Authenticated DSR. A straightforward way to authenticate the RREQ and RREP packets is to add a hop-by-hop Message Authentication Code (MAC) to these packets as they travel the network. We use the broadcast keys that are established by the Neighborhood Discovery protocol to authenticate the Route Request packets. The Route Reply packets are unicast and are thus protected by the link keys that are established within a neighborhood. We add incremented counters to prevent replay attacks. If we wish to prevent attackers from learning the topology of the network by eavesdropping on these routing packets, we can also encrypt them using a symmetric cipher and the broadcast keys (RREQ) or link keys (RREP) that are present within a neighborhood. We will refer to this authenticated DSR implementation as AuthDSR.
Adding the Wandering Nodes scheme. Suppose that node S wishes to establish a link key with node R. Node S initiates the protocol by sending a RREQ packet targeted at R that includes a request to establish a link key. Node R can determine the number of routes to S by counting the RREQ packets (containing different routes) it receives during some interval τ that were initiated by S. During this interval τ it does not immediately answers these RREQ packets, but stores them in memory. After the delay τ it generates a secret key SR, applies the secret sharing scheme, adds one of the shares to each RREQ packet, and transmits it.
Performance evaluation
In this section we analyze the computational and communication cost of our scheme. The overhead of our scheme exists in updating the broadcast groups as nodes wander through the network and setting up link keys with the current neighborhood. We compare the cost of our scheme with the cost of an equivalent scheme that utilizes asymmetric cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves [1, 11] .
On a unit of cost
In order to add and compare the different costs, we use one and the same unit for all costs: one AES 128-block encryption using a 128 key. We call this 1 encryption unit or 1 eu. Using the measurements of Hodjat en Verbauwhede [7] , we can conclude the following:
• 1 block encryption = decryption = 1 eu;
• ECDSA generation = ECIES decryption = 3000 eu;
• ECDSA verification = ECIES encryption = 6000 eu;
• transmitting/receiving 1 bit = 0.031 eu/0.021 eu.
Cost evaluation
Comparing the cost of symmetric operations to asymmetric operations, we can conclude that the overhead (due to the use of secret sharing over multiple routes) of setting up the link keys using our scheme will not be more than the additional cost of using asymmetric techniques as these will require at least one certificate verification.
The overhead of setting up broadcast groups using Secure Neighborhood Discovery however requires more detailed investigation. We have simulated our scheme using a simulator that we have written in Java. We simulated a sensor network of 101 nodes that travel in a "river" that is 4 m wide and 1 km in length. They follow a random zigzagging path with an average speed of 3.5 m/s. The nodes have a range of 0.5 m and we evaluate the change in neighborhood every 100 ms (∆T = 100). The neighborhood radius is equal to 2. Figure 3 shows the output of the simulation for one node as it evolves over time. The top-most graph shows the number of overlap between two consecutive neighborhoods. The middle graph shows the number of 1-hop neighbors, and the bottom graph shows the number of nodes that have joined or left the 1-hop neighborhood. Figure 3 shows that, although the number of 1-hop neighbors occasionally drops to only 1 or 2 neighbors, the overlap between two consecutive neighborhoods never drops below 30 nodes. This ensures that nodes never get isolated from the rest of the network. The average 1-hop neighborhood size is 17 nodes.
If we implement the broadcast groups using the EHBT group key management scheme [21] , then the total computational cost (for one node) of our scheme is about 880 eu/s; the total communication cost of this node is about 10 times larger (8870 eu/s). This adds up to a total overhead of about 9750 eu/s. 1 For comparison: a single ECDSA signed message broadcast, that is verified by the average 1-hop neighborhood of 17 nodes, requires about 58000 eu (not counting communication costs and computing the hash of the message). This means that the break-even point is located at a single ECDSA authenticated broadcast every 6 seconds. The moment authenticated broadcasts are transmitted at a faster rate, our scheme is more efficient (including the overhead) than using ECDSA (not including any overhead).
8. Security analysis 8.1. Informal analysis of the secure neighborhood discovery process
When a sensor node has been compromised (for example by extracting the keys from its memory module), the 1 In this evaluation we have assumed that the cost of both hash function evaluation and encryption/decryption of a single block are equal. Figure 3 . Simulation result the Secure Link Discovery process for one node as it evolves over time.
adversary can utilize these captured keys to launch attacks. If this is somehow detected and reported, then this node can be excluded from the system. Excluding a node S from the network can be achieved by asking every node in the current neighborhood of S to delete all keying material related to S and establish fresh broadcast keys. However, in the scenario of unattended DSNs we envision here, detecting compromised nodes might prove to be very difficult.
If a compromised node stays in the network undetected, then this node can communicate and setup keys with all the nodes in its neighborhood. This means that the compromised node can decrypt all messages that are routed through it and that it can ask nodes to forward messages and hence actively take part in the network. However, knowledge of the keying material of node S does not enable an attacker to learn the link keys shared between other nodes in the neighborhood (nor in the rest of the network obviously) since these are established using secret sharing over multiple paths. Moreover, a compromised node cannot broaden the neighborhood it shares keys with, it can only change it. While wandering through the network, nodes entering the compromised node's neighborhood will establish keys with it, and nodes leaving the neighborhood will remove related keying material and exclude it from their broadcast group. This effectively limits the amount of data that is revealed to the adversary after compromising a sensor node.
Informal analysis of AuthDSR
If an adversary is able to disrupt the normal routing process, this can cripple the whole network operation. Multiple attacks on different routing protocols for ad hoc networks and sensor networks have been proposed in the literature (an overview can be found in [14] ).
AuthDSR authenticates every routing packet with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) using the broadcast keys for Route Request packets and the pairwise link keys shared between nodes for the Route Reply packets. Replay of these messages is prevented by including incrementing counter values in the input for the MAC. Authenticating the routing packets prevents an "outsider" (attacker without knowledge of any keys) from disrupting the routing process.
An attacker that has compromised one or more nodes can actively take part in the routing process and hence try to disrupt it by replaying, changing or spoofing routing packets. However, our scheme can minimize the impact of these attacks. First, since routing packets are authenticated and cannot be replayed, the adversary can only launch an attack within the limited neighborhood of the compromised node (since it only possesses keying material related to its neighborhood). Again, this zone cannot be broadened but only shifted to another set of nodes. Second, because the attacks are localized within a small zone, they are likely to be detected the surrounding honest nodes. Third, once the malicious node has been detected, it can be excluded from the network.
The attack that is most difficult to detect and prevent is the Wormhole attack [9] . In the wormhole attack, two distant malicious nodes try to convince the network that they are only a single hop apart. In order to achieve this, they use an out-of-band low latency link that is invisible to the sensor network. This wormhole can attract nodes to route traffic through it and hence through the malicious nodes. For an outside adversary, the wormhole attack is not applicable since nodes will only accept routing packets from the nodes with which it shares a broadcast key. This means that an adversary cannot forward some RREQ packet through the wormhole and replay it to the target node (the node corresponding to the DestAddr in the RREQ packet). An inside adversary will have to compromise at least two sensor nodes to create a wormhole in our scheme (we will call these two compromised nodes the wormhole's entry point and terminus). Our AuthDSR protocol in itself cannot prevent this attack as the adversary will be able to forward an RREQ packet (coming from node S and directed at R) through the wormhole, compute a valid MAC on it at the wormhole's terminus and broadcast it to the target node R. The RREP packet from R can again be forwarded through the wormhole, a MAC using the link key shared between S and the wormhole's entry point can be added, and a valid RREQ containing the route through the wormhole can be delivered to S. However, successfully creating a wormhole does not compromise the link key that is established between nodes S and R because of the use of secret shares that do not pass through the wormhole. This reduces the wormhole attack to a sinkhole attack. In a sinkhole attack a malicious node tries to attract packets from its neighbors and then drops them. This behavior can be detected (albeit difficult) and again the malicious nodes can be excluded from the network.
Evolution of compromised link keys
In this section we discuss the evolution of compromised link keys in time. Obviously this evolution depends on a large number of assumptions. Nevertheless, we believe that this evaluation gives valuable insights in the dynamics of our scheme.
Assumptions. We assume that the attacker can eavesdrop on every transmission (global eavesdropper) and a fraction c of the link keys is compromised at some moment in time t c after the initial deployment phase. We assume that every link key is equally likely to be compromised at any moment in time. In order to simplify the calculations we assume a symmetric network in which every node has exactly k nodes in its neighborhood. The total number of nodes in the network is K. A link key is established using n randomly chosen paths, and a (m, n) secret sharing scheme (at least m shares must be known to compute the link key). We assume that the average length of these paths is twice the neighborhood radius (l = 2h) as normally nodes will enter the neighborhood at the border. As the nodes in the network move, old link keys are discarded and new link keys are established; we assume a discrete time t that grows with '1' every time this happens. Finally, let f (t) be the fraction of compromised link keys at time t.
Evolution. After the initial deployment phase, every node will share a link key with its k neighbors, resulting in a total of Kk link keys. At time t c the attacker learns a fraction c of these link keys (for example by compromising a fraction c of the nodes), providing her with knowledge of cKk of these link keys; or f (t c ) = c.
A new link key established using the (m, n) secret sharing scheme will be known to the attacker if at least m path of length l contain at least one known link key. If a fraction f (t) of all link keys is known to the attacker, then the probability that the attacker will learn the new link key is
There are Kk link keys in the system. Every time one of them is replaced by a new one, the fraction f of compromised link keys changes as follows:
It is easy to verify that f (t + 1) < f(t), if P (t) < f(t) (independent of Kk). However, the network size does determine the rate of change of f . Note that there are only three possible states for the system: continues increase of the fraction of compromised link keys, continues decrease, or no change (P (t) = f (t)). In the last state, the fraction of compromised link keys is fixed on f (t c ) = c. Without any additional external changes, the system will stay in one state, i.e., if the fraction decreases at time t c + 1, it keeps decreasing. Table 1 shows the influence of different parameters on the maximum supported fraction of compromised link keys. Both longer paths (larger cells) and more robust secret sharing schemes make it easier for the attacker to compromise new link keys. This shows that there is a clear trade off between security (small cells, secret sharing schemes with m ≈ n) and robustness (large cells, secret sharing schemes with large n/m ratio). 
Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced the concept of neighborhood in a dynamic environment and used this to adaptively establish keys within a wireless ad hoc network. Our Wandering Nodes scheme ensures that nodes share secret link keys and a broadcast key with their neighborhood at all times as the nodes wander through the network. We have shown how these keys can be used to create a secure implementation of the dynamic source routing protocol and how our scheme can be integrated with dynamic source routing. Finally, we have simulated our scheme and compared the overhead to an equivalent scheme that depends on asymmetric cryptosystems.
